EchoStar’s $40bn spectrum sell-off to AT&T and SpaceX ends its own ambitions to be a fourth mobile operator in the U.S., and boosts capacity for other terrestrial and satellite providers. It also complicates FCC auction plans under the OBBBA, potentially reshaping U.S. wireless policy.
In a recent series of proposed transactions that have the potential to alter the U.S. wireless landscape, EchoStar — which owns Dish and its Boost Mobile brand — appears poised to sell about $40 billion-worth of spectrum licenses to AT&T and SpaceX. It is also rumored to be selling additional frequency holdings, perhaps to Verizon and/or T-Mobile.
These transactions have a number of important implications:
– EchoStar’s ambition to be the fourth major U.S. national mobile operator has ended. Its Dish subsidiary had been rolling out an advanced network, based on Open RAN technology, but this proved slower and more complicated than expected.
– AT&T (and perhaps other large carriers) seems to have meaningfully satisfied (at least part of) a near-term desire for more mid-band spectrum, enabling it to compete on a more level footing with other large carriers in the U.S., including T-Mobile US.
– SpaceX will now have more capacity for its satellite constellation, especially for new direct-to-device (D2D) connections to smartphones.
Congress’s mandate to the FCC to repurpose and auction 800MHz of spectrum for mobile use, under the recently passed One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), may warrant revisiting. 300MHz was supposed to be from reallocating and auctioning existing commercial (non-Federal) bands, but with carriers now adding significant new holdings via secondary market transactions, that target may now be unnecessarily high; in any case, these transactions would be expected to decrease the expected sums to be raised for the U.S. Treasury.
At a minimum, the amount of additional exclusive spectrum to be yielded by the EchoStar transactions should take some pressure off policy makers and allow them to carefully and methodically make future spectrum policy decisions under the OBBBA, especially given potential C-Band availability as well. This means less rationale for disrupting existing commercial wireless like the Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) or 6GHz unlicensed bands as some have pushed to do.
The backstory is that EchoStar appears to have “jumped before it was pushed”. Its slow network deployment, coupled with anaemic levels of commercial uptake for Dish’s services, attracted scrutiny from both the FCC over buildout obligations and the financial community over its debt repayments.
There had been various signs that the FCC was considering clawing back some of EchoStar’s spectrum for possible license breaches, with the possible (presumed?) intent of subsequently re-auctioning it. It seems the company’s management decided that selling the spectrum and pulling back from its network ambitions yielded a better return, generating liquidity while avoiding action over alleged “spectrum warehousing.”
How AT&T, SpaceX, and maybe Verizon, can use the spectrum
AT&T
In late August 2025, AT&T agreed to acquire high-powered exclusive spectrum licenses from EchoStar in two key spectrum bands for $23 billion. This includes 30MHz of nationwide 3.45GHz midband spectrum and roughly 20MHz of 600MHz low-band spectrum.
Importantly, the midband assets should prove easy to deploy and commercialize as an extension of AT&T’s existing infrastructure in that frequency range, and should also be supported by devices and chipsets already in the market. This means that they are considerably more attractive than any new band without an established ecosystem and supply chain. There is also a much simpler and faster path to clearance of existing usage (i.e., EchoStar itself) than would be the case in a completely new band.
The extra 600MHz capacity should enhance AT&T’s coverage in rural areas, as well as improving in-building penetration from its outdoor network in urban settings. Low-band frequencies propagate over longer distances and penetrate obstacles more effectively than higher frequencies.
As part of the agreement, EchoStar’s Boost Mobile will transition to a hybrid or mobile virtual (MVNO) model, utilizing AT&T’s infrastructure while maintaining its own cloud-native 5G core and perhaps some of its own remaining wireless assets or unlicensed access.
SpaceX
In early September 2025, EchoStar announced a further transaction with SpaceX’s Starlink business. The deal for AWS-4 and H-block spectrum licenses is worth $17 billion, plus about $2 billion in debt-interest payments. In addition, in November 2025, SpaceX also announced a separate deal for acquiring unpaired AWS-3 spectrum for $2.6bn, and has already asked the FCC to include this band in the Supplementary Coverage from Space rules.
The most likely use of this spectrum is to upgrade Starlink’s existing D2D solution to go beyond basic messaging services and 4G connectivity, to offer at least voice telephony and narrowband 5G data for smartphones in remote / rural areas, or during emergencies. At present, this is positioned as an add-on to terrestrial 4G/5G services, via partners such as T-Mobile. EchoStar’s Boost subscribers will also be able to use it.
Some commentators suggest a long-term vision of Starlink offering completely integrated mobile services, using a seamless mix of satellite and some fill-in terrestrial systems of its own — maybe targeted at specific user segments such as vehicles (most obviously Tesla). Certainly, it gains more spectrum flexibility, without the need to rely on leasing/sharing of terrestrial operators’ bands.
Others suggest a fully space-based or satellite-primary mobile network to compete head-to-head against the three main terrestrial networks and retail MVNOs. However, this seems technically implausible, given constraints such as overall capacity, indoor coverage, and battery life. In any case, these MSS bands currently have limited support in today’s smartphones and chipsets. It would take several years for this to change — and would only occur if suppliers felt that volume shipments would be large enough.
Verizon or T-Mobile next?
It is unclear what will happen to the roughly 45MHz of exclusive spectrum that EchoStar still retains across the 700MHz, paired AWS-3 (1.7GHz and 2.1GHz), and CBRS bands.
The latter includes around 5500 PAL licenses covering most of the US population, but with limited active use. Various observers have commented that there is a good fit with Verizon’s network and existing assets, while others have reported that T-Mobile is also in talks with EchoStar. At the very least, it seems likely that both remaining “Big Three” carriers are closely weighing the opportunity, and maybe others as well.
What’s next for spectrum policy in light of these transactions?
At one level, the EchoStar deals could be seen as just “normal private spectrum trades.” But the context is extremely important. First, the FCC had been investigating EchoStar and may have been hoping to claw back some of the spectrum for future auctions. And second, under the OBBBA, the Commission is anticipating large sums to be raised in auction fees for the Treasury.
Now, the calculus for the FCC has changed, and it is unclear how it will react to these EchoStar spectrum transactions. Options include:
– “Business as usual:” It could just ignore the transactions as having any relevance to its OBBBA mandate and continue with its current auction plans.
– Adjust its OBBBA target: If the FCC deems these transactions to have advanced national objectives on wireless spectrum capacity materially, it could attempt to reduce the 500MHz / 300MHz auction targets (the total 800 MHz pipeline). This would likely need government approval and an amendment to the Act, or at least some “creative re-interpretation,” especially as it would have budgetary implications. Alternatively, the FCC might consider readjusting its approach to identifying which bands of spectrum could be auctioned. In particular, there is even less justification or disrupting existing CBRS and 6GHz unlicensed / Wi-Fi commercial operations.
– Adjust the timing: The FCC could extend the current highly-compressed timeline to enable all stakeholders to acquire and deploy numerous spectrum bands in a manageable — and financially sustainable — manner.
– Taxes or fees: If the FCC views these transactions as some sort of workaround to avoid future auctions, it could implement either a one-off windfall tax or fee on buyers and/or EchoStar as the seller or create a new general regulatory approach to such deals. However, that might deter future private transactions and reduce the liquidity of the broader secondary market for spectrum.
– Conditions: The FCC could potentially impose conditions for approving these transactions, for instance, insisting that the deals be left open for competing bidders to offer a higher price and/or a supplementary fee to be paid to the Treasury. This would likely be questioned from a legal standpoint, but there could be mechanisms that could allow the FCC to claim the process became “auction-like,” for instance, if EchoStar or its bankers essentially ran a bidding war.
At present, the FCC has not made a clear statement about the implications of the EchoStar spectrum transactions for the OBBBA mandate.
Conclusion
The EchoStar transactions with AT&T and SpaceX (and possibly others) are highly significant, both for the FCC’s auction plans and the broader future structure of the wireless industry in the US. They highlight the value and strategic importance of low- and midband frequencies and also demonstrate the seriousness of the satellite industry in expanding its spectrum footprint.
That would be significant enough on its own, but the 800MHz OBBBA spectrum mandate raises even more questions around these transactions. Should the Act’s parameters, amounts, or timelines be changed? Are private transactions essentially competing with auctions, with the Treasury losing out on revenues? Does it favor capital-rich incumbents over new entrants? Should future auctions all be designed to be “satellite-friendly” to broaden the base of potential bidders and valuations obtainable?
Should these transactions further encourage the FCC to avoid the risks of disrupting commercial operations in other bands such as CBRS or 6GHz unlicensed for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, given the now satiated (or reduced) needs of the larger wireless carriers?
Potentially, the answers all lie in the sphere of more sophisticated spectrum management. EchoStar’s woes and frequency under-usage have, ironically, illustrated the inefficiencies of exclusive, nationwide and high-power mobile licenses, as well as satellite allocations designed for a pre-D2D era.
Licensed spectrum that is not actively deployed and used should be monitored and perhaps re-allocated via dynamic processes. With an appropriate fee structure, that could yield benefits in innovation, U.S. technology leadership, and revenues to satisfy budgetary requirements.
